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CLD-087        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







                                   Appellant 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-02396) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 27, 2013 
 
Before:  FUENTES, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 








 Timothy Hatten, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the following 




 Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only the facts necessary for 
our discussion.  Hatten is serving a prison sentence imposed by the District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida for federal narcotics law violations.  See United States v. 
Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1998).  Between January 2009 and July 2011, he was 
found guilty by Discipline Hearing Officers (“DHOs”) of numerous disciplinary 
violations including destroying property, refusing to obey an order, threatening, and 
interfering with staff.  Among other things, Hatten‟s disciplinary proceedings resulted in 
the loss of good conduct time credits.  In December 2011, while he was incarcerated in a 
federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, Hatten filed a habeas petition claiming 
that his right to due process had been violated in those proceedings.  The District Court 
determined that his claims were meritless and denied the petition.  Hatten now appeals.
1
 
 It is well-settled that although “prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a 
criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings 
does not apply,” prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits.  Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).  Thus, when a 
disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of credits, an inmate has a right to appear 
before an impartial decision-maker and must receive: (1) written notice of the charges at 
least 24 hours prior to the hearing; (2) an opportunity to call witnesses and present 
evidence; (3) an opportunity to receive assistance from an inmate representative; and (4) 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  See Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (certificate of appealability not required to appeal the denial of a federal prisoner‟s § 2241 petition).  Our 





a written statement of the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action.  
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–71.  Revocation of good time must also be supported by “some 
evidence.”  Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  This requirement is 
minimal, and is satisfied if there is “any evidence in the record that could support the 
conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”  Id. at 455–56.     
 We agree with the District Court that Hatten was afforded due process during the 
challenged disciplinary hearings as required by Wolff and Hill.
2
  Despite his claims to the 
contrary, the DHO Reports for each of these incidents reflect that Hatten had ample 
notice in each case and that at each hearing he was afforded an opportunity to present 
evidence on his behalf,
3
 received assistance from an inmate representative, and was given 
a copy of the written decision afterwards.  We likewise agree with the District Court‟s 
determination that the revocation of good conduct time credits was supported by 
sufficient evidence in each instance. 
 In particular, we reject Hatten‟s argument that his due process rights were violated 
when the DHO conducted hearings relating to Incident Report Nos. 2177122, 2186134, 
and 2186530 after his removal.  A prisoner‟s right to attend his own disciplinary hearings 
is implicit in the prisoner‟s right to call witnesses and present evidence.  Battle v. Barton, 
                                              
2
 It appears that several of Hatten‟s claims were not properly exhausted prior to filing the instant petition.  
Nevertheless, the District Court denied them on their merits.  Because we agree with the District Court that these 
claims were meritless, any error in doing so was harmless.  We note also that Hatten successfully appealed the 
results of his first hearing regarding Incident Report No. 1823778.  The results were vacated, and he received a re-
hearing on the charges.  Any due process claims arising from the original, vacated proceedings are therefore moot. 
3
 We agree with the District Court that Hatten‟s claims that he was denied access to video evidence in two of his 
proceedings was without merit.  The evidence he sought to proffer was immaterial given that those proceedings 




970 F.2d 779, 782 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (collecting citations).  But that right is 
limited by “the competing concerns of maintaining institutional safety and other 
correctional goals.”  Id. (quoting Smith v. Mass. Dep‟t. of Corr., 936 F.2d 1390, 1399 
(1st Cir. 1991); see also 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(e) (permitting DHOs to conduct hearings in 
absentia).  Thus, the DHO was permitted to conduct the hearing in Hatten‟s absence if the 
reasons for doing so were “logically related . . . to „institutional safety or correctional 
goals.‟”  Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985). 
 Here, the prison has met its burden to demonstrate that Hatten‟s removal was 
justified by such institutional concerns.  See Grandison v. Cuyler, 774 F.2d 598, 604 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  The DHO‟s reports indicate that Hatten was removed after telling the DHO 
that he had “fired” his staff representative and insisting that the hearing therefore could 
not proceed; when he was informed otherwise, he refused to participate further in the 
proceedings, instead raising his voice and alleging violations of his right to due process.  
It is indisputable that such behavior “threatened the basic correctional goal of institutional 
order and undermined the authority of the hearing panel.”  Battle, 970 F.2d at 783.  
Accordingly, we therefore hold that conducting Hatten‟s disciplinary hearing in his 
absence did not violate his right to due process under Wolff.  Id. (holding that no due 
process violation occurred where an inmate was excluded from a disciplinary hearing 
after becoming uncooperative); see also Ponte, 471 U.S. at 497. 
 Because Hatten‟s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 & I.O.P. 10.6. 
